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CASE MOTES
the same time, insurers can protect their subrogation interests by paying
their insureds the settlement amount offered by the tortfeasor. Each
party thus gives up a right while securing a benefit.
Torts-EXCLUSIVE CONTROL UNDER STRICT LIABILITY AND RES IPSA
LOQUITUR-Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856 (Minn.
1984).
Natural gas is a major source of energy used in millions of homes and
businesses throughout the United States., Gas is transported to residen-
tial and industrial users through hidden networks of underground, pres-
surized pipelines.2 Although the transmission of natural gas is relatively
safe, when accidents do occur, extensive property damage, personal in-
jury, and even death can result.3 Under such circumstances, the salient
issue is whether negligence or strict liability is the appropriate standard
to impose on the defendant gas distributor.4
I. See 23 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS ANNOTATED Gas Explosions § 2, at 452 (1969).
"At one time manufactured gas was the common utility gas, but a trend developed to
natural gas, which is cleaner and more convenient .... Today natural gas is the major
utility gas in a greatly expanded market." Id.
2. See Note, Liabih'y of Natural Gas Transmission Line Operators.- United States and Cana-
dian Theories of Liability for Gas Transmission Line Accidents, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 455, 455 (1980). In the United States there are 263,000 miles of natural gas trans-
mission pipelines. 10 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NATURAL GAS PIPELINE SAFETY ACT AN-
NUAL REPORT i (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
3. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 3 n.1. There were 466 failures involving trans-
mission and gathering lines reported to the Department of Transportation in 1977. Id.
Fewer than 25 deaths occur each year in the United States from natural gas explosions.
Id
4. See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 14.3, at 794 (1956)
(policy basis for liability without fault); W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 545 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PROSSER & KEETON] (abnormally dangerous things and activities); Coleman,
The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259 (1976) (discussing moral-
ity of strict liability as a tort standard); Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision
of Certath Types of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 805 (1930) (discussing risk allocation as
strong element in case decisions); Samuel, Strict Liabity: Advance, Retreat-or Advancing
Backwards?, 6 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 99 (1977) (analysis of res ipsa loquitur as a tool for
importing strict liability into negligence cases); Fault and Liability. Two Views of Legal Devel-
opment, 31 HARV. L. REV. 954, 966 (1918) (discussing theories of imposing liability without
fault).
Because natural gas is an abnormally dangerous substance and gas distributors are
more capable of cost spreading, courts have been urged to reject the negligence standards
and find distributors strictly liable. See Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d
856, 864-65 (Minn. 1984) (Todd, J., dissenting); New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washing-
ton Water Power Co., 34 Wash. App. 25, 36-40, 659 P.2d 1113, 1119-21 (1983) (Mclnturff,
J., dissenting), noted in Mahowald, 344 N.W.2d at 861-62.
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In Mahowa/d o. Minnesota Gas Co.,5 the Minnesota Supreme Court ad-
dressed a situation involving a natural gas explosion in which the parties
were unable to prove who was at fault. The explosion was caused by a
gas line leak. The court refused to impose strict liability on the gas dis-
tributor which owned the gas line. Writing for the majority, Justice Kel-
ley reasoned that holding a gas distributor strictly liable would produce
the inequitable result of making the distributor an insurer of its custom-
ers.6 The court reasoned, "Equity in this type of case will better be
served by the less drastic measure of shifting to the gas distributor the
burden of overcoming an inference of negligence. . . under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur." 7 Mahowaldthus affirms the common law rule that a
gas distributor is liable only if negligent,8 but allows the plaintiff the
benefit of a res ipsa loquitur instruction.9
5. 344 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1984).
6. See id at 859. For cases stating that the gas distributor is not an insurer of the
safety of its mains, see Lindstrum v. Illinois N. Utils. Co., 214 I11. App. 560, 562-63 (1919);
Westfield Gas Corp. v. Hill, 131 Ind. App. 558, 571, 169 N.E.2d 726, 733 (1960);
Blackman v. Iowa Union Elec. Co., 234 Iowa 859, 862, 14 N.W.2d 721, 723 (1944);
Greaney v. Holyoke Water-Power Co., 174 Mass. 437, 440, 54 N.E. 880, 881 (1899); Gould
v. Winona Gas Co., 100 Minn. 258, 264, 111 N.W. 254, 256 (1907); Bellevue Gas & Oil
Co. v. Carr, 61 Okla. 290, 293, 161 P. 203, 206 (1916); Di Sandro v. Providence Gas Co.,
40 R.I. 551,558, 102 A. 617,620 (1918); Nashville Gas & Heating Co. v. Phillips, 17 Tenn.
App. 648, 665, 69 S.W.2d 914, 924 (1933).
7. 344 N.W.2d at 859. Commentators have suggested that the use of res ipsa loqui-
tur is in itself a movement toward strict liability. See M. MILLNER, NEGLIGENCE IN MOD-
ERN LAW 91-93 (1967).
Res ipsa loquitur is an immensely important vehicle for importing strict liability
into negligence cases. In practice, there are many cases where res ipsa loquitur is
properly invoked in which the defendant is unable to show affirmatively .. .
that the particular cause of the injury was not associated with negligence on his
part. . . .[T]he theoretical limitations of the maxim are quite overshadowed by
its practical significance.
Id at 92-93 (footnote omitted), quoted in Samuel, supra note 4, at 99; see also PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 4, § 40, at 259; Jacks, Res Ipsa Loquitur vn Fire Insurance Cases, 1966
A.B.A. SEC. INS. NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. 362, 372 (discussing reluctance of courts to
"'open up the door' to a form of strict liability in this area"); Samuel, supra note 4, at 117
(advocating use of doctrine to "raise the level of duty .. .to strict liability where the
activity . . . warrants it"); Stone, Touchstones of Tort Liability, 2 STAN. L. REV. 259, 281-82
(1950) (discussing res ipsa doctrine as one used to shift burden of proof "for some reason
other than intention, negligence, or unlawfulness").
8. 344 N.W.2d at 859. The court held it "neither advisable nor necessary" to over-
rule the negligence rule established in Could Id
9. Id at 864. Courts have applied res ipsa loquitur in several gas transmission acci-
dent cases. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Long Beach, 42 Cal. 2d 716, 717, 268 P.2d 1061,
1061 (1954) (defendant required to produce evidence to meet inference of negligence, but
"not required to prove himself free from negligence by a preponderance of evidence");
Metz v. Central I11. Elec. & Gas Co., 32 I11. 2d 446, 450, 207 N.E.2d 305, 307-08 (1965)
(where digging near the main had occurred seven years before the explosion, in the ab-
sence of an explanation by the party charged, the inference that the occurrence was
caused by lack of due care was proper; exclusive control was based on defendant's non-
delegable responsibility to maintain the lines at all times); Schneider v. Keokuk Gas Serv.
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One of the underlying rationales in the early cases which held gas
companies to the negligence standard rather than strict liability was that
the economic impact on infant and developing industries was less se-
vere.' o The negligence rule is credited with encouraging the develop-
ment of not only the gas industry, but of industry and business in
general. 1I I
As business and industry matured, the modern doctrine of strict liabil-
ity developed.' 2 Historically, strict liability has been imposed in situa-
Co., 250 Iowa 37, 41, 92 N.W.2d 439, 441 (1958) (noting that in addition to the gas dis-
tributor's exclusive control, the explosion of such a dangerous commodity would not have
occurred if due care had been exercised); Grimes v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 133 Minn.
394, 158 N.W. 623 (1916) (when gas from damaged pipe injured trees, shrubs, and vegeta-
tion, evidence tending to show that the break came from settling of the ground and not
faulty construction of the pipe did not overcome the inference of negligence); Manning v.
St. Paul Gaslight Co., 129 Minn. 55, 151 N.W. 423 (1915) (res ipsa properly applied in
case where plaintiff's intestate was asphyxiated by illuminating gas which entered the
building through a break in the service pipe); Gould, 100 Minn. 258, 111 N.W. 254 (res ipsa
imposed where gas pipes' condition was peculiarly within the knowledge of the gas
company).
10. 344 N.W.2d at 865-66 (Todd, J., dissenting); see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
4, § 78, at 549.
11. See Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1717,
1724 (1982) (in addition to subsidizing industrial development, the negligence rule is also
credited with maximizing the efficient use of scarce resources); see also L. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 409-11 (1973); M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 67-108 (1977); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
§ 6.11, at 137-42 (1981).
12. During the past century strict liability has gradually increased in importance in
tort law. Strict liability has traditionally been imposed when damage is done by trespass-
ing livestock, see, e.g., Page v. Hollingsworth, 7 Ind. 317 (1855); or by wild or vicious
animals, see, e.g., Zarek v. Fredericks, 138 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1943) (child bitten by dog
whose owner knew it was vicious); Collins v. Otto, 149 Colo. 489, 369 P.2d 564 (1962)
(child bitten by coyote harbored by landlord).
The modern development of the doctrine of strict liability began with the case of
Rylands v. Fletcher, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, I L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), afd, 3 L.R.-E.
& I. App. 330 (1868). The defendants, who were mill owners, had constructed a large
reservoir for the purpose of collecting water. The plaintiff was damaged when the water
escaped into an abandoned coal shaft and eventually ran into plaintiff's mines. The rule
deduced from Rylands is "that the defendant will be liable when he damages another by a
thing or activity unduly dangerous and inappropriate to the place where it is maintained,
in the light of the character of that place and its surroundings." PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 4, § 78, at 547-48. Prosser and Keeton provide a historical background to the
development of strict liability, comparing its acceptance and development in English and
American courts. Id § 78.
The Rylands v. Fletcher principle forms the basis of §§ 519 and 520 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts dealing with liability for abnormally dangerous activities:
§ 519 General Principle
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability
for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
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tions where injury or damage has been caused by a highly dangerous
activity.13 The policy supporting the strict liability doctrine is based
upon the imposition of liability against anyone who, for his own pur-
poses, creates an abnormal risk of harm to others. t4 Liability for injury
arises even when such an activity is carried out with all due care.' 5
The increased application of strict liability can be attributed in part to
a growing perception that accident victims as a class can no longer bear
the consequences of uncompensated loss under the negligence stan-
dard.16 In addition, courts have acknowledged that the enterprise is the
superior cost bearer because it is in a position to spread losses among the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976).
§ 520 Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following fac-
tors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels
of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
Id § 520.
When natural gas is collected in large quantities, strict liability has been applied. See
McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Or. 324, 327-28, 467 P.2d 635, 637 (1970).
However, the transmission of natural gas through mains arguably is not so abnormally
dangerous or non-natural as to trigger Rylands or the Restatement rule. See W. PROSSER &
W.P. KEETON, supra note 4, § 78, at 546-48 (discussion of activities considered abnormally
dangerous); see also Schwartz, The Vtalay of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA.
L. REV. 963, 970-71 (1981) (activities designated as ultrahazardous or abnormally danger-
ous are rare); Note, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in America." Abnormally Dangerous, Ul-
trahazardous, or Absolute Nuisance', 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 99, 100-01 (discussing the lingering
difficulties of the Rylands theory in American courts).
13. Strict liability has expanded recently to encompass new subject areas. Liability in
the area of worker's compensation, for example, has shifted from a fault to a no-fault basis.
See I A. LARSON, LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 1.20, 2.10 (1984). Movement
has also occurred in areas where injuries arise out of the use of defective products, see
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977); and automobile accidents, see,
e.g., Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41-.71 (1982 &
Supp. 1983).
14. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 75, at 536-38.
15. See Reynolds, Strict Tort Liability." Has "Abnormal Danger" Become a Fact', 34 OKLA.
L. REV. 76, 79 (1981). Liability without fault is usually imposed because it seems more
equitable to shift losses to the creator of the dangerous activity than it does to impose them
on the person least able to pay: the victim. Furthermore, dangerous activities by their
very nature frequently destroy any evidence which could have been used to prove negli-
gence. Id at 76. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 comment d
(1977) (he who undertakes the risk must pay his own way); id § 520 comment b; Klemme,
The Enterprse Liability Theogy of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 158-59 (1976).
16. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 4, § 14.3, at 794-95.
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many who benefit from its activities. 17
The common law rule, reaffirmed in Mahowald, of employing a negli-
gence standard was established in Minnesota in 1907 in Gould V. Wnona
Gas Co. 18 The Gould court noted that the theory of strict liability as de-
veloped in the seminal case of Rylands v. Flelcher'9 had been adopted in
Minnesota, 20 but nevertheless refused to apply it against gas distributors.
The Gouldcourt reasoned that the inapplicability of strict liability to gas
leak cases was based primarily on common sense,2 1 reflecting the period's
dominant legal theory that a party's responsibility for damages rests
solely on legal culpability.22 Most jurisdictions continue to use the negli-
gence standard to determine liability in natural gas escape cases. 23 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has continued to affirm the negligence rule
while rejecting strict liability.
2 4
17. See id at 795; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 75, at 536-38 (strict
liability as applied to abnormally dangerous activities involves the tacit understanding
that some enterprises are so valuable to society that they are tolerated in spite of dangers,
but must pay their own way when harm occurs).
Justice Todd, in his Mahowald dissent, stated that due to the nature of the gas com-
pany's franchise and its ability to spread losses over a broad group of ratepayers, when a
third-party tortfeasor cannot be identified, the gas company should bear the responsibility
of establishing the cause of the explosion. 344 N.W.2d at 864 (Todd, J., dissenting).
18. 100 Minn. 258, 11t N.W. 254 (1907).
19. 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, I L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), arfd, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App.
330 (1868); see supra note 12 (discussion of ylands v. Fletcher).
20. Gould, 100 Minn. at 259, 111 N.W. at 254. The rule of Rylands v. Fletcher was
adopted in Minnesota in Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (Gil. 292) (1871) (plaintiff's
property sustained damage when water from a river escaped into a tunnel). The Minne-
sota Supreme Court later applied the rule of strict liability to a situation involving a bro-
ken water main. See Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 158 Minn. 509, 511, 197
N.W. 971, 972 (1924) (water main capable of discharging 500,000 gallons per hour broke
near plaintiff's residence causing flood damage to plaintiff's property); see also Sachs v.
Chiat, 281 Minn. 540, 544, 162 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1968) (concussion from pile-driving
operation damaged plaintiff's residence); Wiltse v. City of Red Wing, 99 Minn. 255, 260,
109 N.W. 114, 115 (1906) (reservoir storing 800,000 gallons of water gave way, damaging
plaintiff's property); Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 60 Minn. 296, 301, 62 N.W. 336,
338 (1895) (escape of stored crude petroleum from neighboring land damaged plaintiff's
premises).
21. See Gould, 100 Minn. at 264, 111 N.W. at 256.
22. See id at 266, 111 N.W. at 257. The Gouldcourt held that despite the adoption of
Ryvlands v. Fletcher, liability in most instances should be based on the concept of legal culpa-
bility. The court's reasoning was that it did not make good sense to impose absolute
liability on an important industry and that the tendency of the law was to base liability
only on culpability. Id," see also Note, supra note 2. "
23. See infra note 49 (providing examples of jurisdictions which have rejected strict
liability in gas transmission cases).
24. See Wilson v. Home Gas Co., 267 Minn. 162, 125 N.W.2d 725 (1964) (propane gas
explosion was not due to alleged negligence of defendant who furnished pipes and fittings
for propane gas system in plaintiff's home); DeVries v. City of Austin, 261 Minn. 52, 110
N.W.2d 529 (1961) (both public contractor and municipality held liable for the negligence
of subcontractors working in area of buried gas line owned and operated by the city);
Bellefuil v. Willmar Gas Co., 243 Minn. 123, 66 N.W.2d 779 (1954) (gas company held
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Under the negligence rule, a gas distributor is held to a standard of
reasonable care in the construction and maintenance of its pipeline sys-
tem. 25 Once the pipeline is installed, the gas distributor has a duty to
perform regular inspections and make routine repairs.26 An injured
plaintiff has the burden to prove that it was the negligence of the gas
distributor which proximately caused the accident.
2 7
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur assists plaintiffs when direct evidence
of negligence is lacking. 28 Res ipsa loquitur applies only if: (1) the acci-
dent would not normally have occurred absent some negligence; (2) the
harm-producing instrumentality was under the exclusive control of the
defendant; and (3) the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent.29
Res ipsa is a form of circumstantial evidence which permits an infer-
ence of negligence from facts and circumstances. 30 Authority is divided
not liable because explosion was due to failure of pilot light on automatic shut-off device,
not company's negligence).
25. See id. at 863; see also Could, 100 Minn. at 269, 111 N.W. at 258 (the care to be
exercised by the gas company is neither ordinary nor extraordinary care, but due care
commensurate with the risk of harm involved); supra note 22 and accompanying text.
26. 344 N.W.2d at 862. The gas distributor has a non-delegable duty to make reason-
able inspections of its pipelines. If the plaintiff suffers injury or property loss due to the
gas distributor's breach of duty, the gas distributor will be held liable for its negligence.
See id.; see, e.g., Phillips v. Delaware Power & Light Co., 57 Del. 466, 469-70, 202 A.2d 131,
132-33 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964) (power company had exclusive right to repair and maintain
mains and pipes and duty of vigilance and attention conforming to particular circum-
stances of disrepair).
27. " 'The basic elements necessary to maintain a claim for negligence are (1) duty;
(2) breach of that duty; (3) that the breach of duty be the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injury; and (4) that plaintiff did in fact suffer injury.' " Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326
N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn. 1982) (quoting Schmanski v. Church of St. Casimir of Wells, 243
Minn. 289, 292, 67 N.W.2d 644, 646 (1954)).
28. See Hestbeck v. Hennepin County, 297 Minn. 419, 426-27, 212 N.W.2d 361, 366
(1973). As Prosser and Keeton note, the third element does not require the plaintiff to be
"completely inactive." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 39, at 254. They state that
"the advent of comparative fault should logically eliminate this element" since the com-
parative fault doctrine "converts the plaintiff's contributing fault from its traditional func-
tion of barring liability into one of merely reducing damages." Id. (footnote omitted).
29. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 39, at 244. The conditions most often re-
quired for the application of res ipsa are those derived from Professor Wigmore in his
treatise on evidence law. Id. at 244; see 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAw § 2509, at 507 (rev. ed. 1981).
30. 344 N.W.2d at 864. Note that the Mahowald court originally stated that res ipsa
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. Id at 863. Subsequently, the court stated
correctly that the burden of proof is retained by the plaintiff and not shifted. Id. at 864; see
also MINN. R. Civ. P. 43.06 ("Res ipsa loquitur shall be regarded as nothing more than
one form of circumstantial evidence creating a permissive inference of negligence").
For the principal decisions in Minnesota discussing the rule of res ipsa loquitur, see
Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 331-32, 188 N.W.2d 426, 433-34
(1971) (it could be inferred from circumstantial evidence that, more likely than not, bottle
of carbonated beverage was defective when it left the company's control); Holkestad v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 288 Minn. 249, 256-57, 180 N.W.2d 860, 865-66 (1970) (jury
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as to whether gas transmission accident cases properly give rise to such
an inference.31 When the doctrine is applied, 32 the plaintiff may gain
considerable procedural advantages, such as avoiding a directed verdict
and getting the case to the jury.33
In late 1970, defendant Minnesota Gas Company (Minnegasco) in-
stalled a gas main in the right-of-way in front of what was to become the
home of the Kannegieters. 34 In early 1974, co-defendant Barbarossa and
Sons (Barbarossa), 35 a contractor, was hired by the City of Prior Lake to
install water and sewer lines in the housing development where the Kan-
negieters' property was located.36 Shortly thereafter, Babarossa struck
and severed a gas main with a backhoe on two separate occasions. 37
verdict of negligence was adequately supported by inferences from circumstantial evi-
dence concerning exploding bottle of carbonated beverage); Wzison, 267 Minn. at 168, 125
N.W.2d at 730 (res ipsa loquitur inapplicable because gas explosion "could have resulted
from one of a number of causes, several of which were not within the control of
defendant").
31. Compare Williams v. City of Long Beach, 42 Cal. 2d 716, 718-19, 268 P.2d 1061,
1061-62 (1954) (it could be inferred from evidence that leaking gas line caused fire dam-
age, but defendant sufficiently countered that evidence) and Schneider v. Keokuk Gas
Serv. Co., 250 Iowa 37, 41, 92 N.W.2d 439, 441 (1958) (res ipsa loquitur applies to cases
involving escaping gas) and Worden v. Union Gas Sys., 182 Kan. 686, 688-89, 324 P.2d
501, 502-03 (1958) ("petition [was] sufficient to establish a primafacti case based on res ipsa
loquziur"where plaintiffs house filled with gas and exploded) with A. & J., Inc. v. Southern
Cities Distrib. Co., 173 La. 1051, 1053-54, 139 So. 477, 478 (1932) (res ipsa loquitur could
not be invoked where plaintiff's building was damaged by an explosion caused by gas
leaking from defendant's pipe main) and Musolino LoConte Co. v. Boston Consol. Gas
Co., 330 Mass. 161, 163-64, 112 N.E.2d 250, 251 (1953) (mere fact of escaping gas from a
broken or cracked main laid several years earlier did not give rise to an inference of
negligence).
32. Curiously, even the majority questioned whether an instruction of res ipsa loqui-
tur was appropriate in Mahowald See 344 N.W.2d at 864. The court acknowledged that
the jury had previously heard the issues of negligence, specifically, Minnegasco's duty to
maintain and inspect its lines, and that it was therefore redundant for the jury to rehear
these issues under the inferential instruction of res ipsa loquitur. Id
33. Set id at 864.
34. Id at 858. The co-plaintiffs in Mahowald were Alice and Michael Kannegieter,
who along with their two children suffered personal injuries and had their home totally
leveled; and the Kannegieters' neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Francis Mahowald and Mr. and
Mrs. Stephen Bock, who also suffered damage to their homes as a result of the explosion
on the morning of February 26, 1977. Appellant's Brief at 2, Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas
Co., 344 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1984).
35. The original party defendants included Barbarossa and Sons; Minnegasco, the
gas distributor; the City of Prior Lake; Wickes-Knox Associates, Inc., the builder of the
Kannegieter's home; Schweich Home Builders, a subcontractor of the home builder;
Blaylock Plumbing Co., which connected sewer and water lines to the Kannegieter house;
and Distribution Construction. 344 N.W.2d at 858-59. Prior to trial, the home builder
was dismissed. Id at 859. Following the presentation of the plaintiffs' case, all other de-
fendants except Minnegasco and Barbarossa and Sons were dismissed. Id
36. Id at 858.
37. Id On April 30, 1974, Barbarossa struck and severed a gas main in the right-of-
way. On May 15, 1974, Barbarossa struck a gas main again. In that instance, the pipe
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Minnegasco was notified of both hits, and sent its employees to the site to
repair the damage.38 Several other entities were also involved in various
types of excavation in and around the right-of-way.
39
The Kannegieter family moved into their newly built home along the
right-of-way in late 1976.40 In February 1977, Mrs. Kannegieter went to
the garage to start her car. As she placed the key in the ignition, an
explosion was triggered which totally destroyed the Kannegieter house
and damaged two neighbors' homes.41
An expert testified at trial42 that the explosion was caused by natural
gas which had leaked from a damaged gas main 43 beneath the right-of-
way in front of the Kannegieter home.44 The testimony revealed that
the pipe had fractured as a result of stress and corrosion caused by a hit
or impact on the pipe.4 5 This hit could have occurred at any time prior
to the explosion, and it was never established which hit actually caused
the eventual fracture.46 Over plaintiffs' objection, the case was given to
the jury on a negligence theory only.47 The jury found both defendants
not negligent.48
was scraped and bent at a point approximately 16 feet from where the gas leak eventually
occurred. Id
38. Id.
39. Id. Schweich Home Builders, a subcontractor of the home builder, graded and
excavated the Kannegieter lot in April 1976. Id. No evidence existed, however, that
Schweich hit the gas line. Id In May 1976, Blaylock Plumbing Co. connected water and
sewer lines to the Kannegieter house. Id Other entities that apparently excavated and
dug in the street near the Kannegieter residence were not named defendants, nor were
their activities of record. Id Those entities, which included telephone, electric, and land-
scaping companies, id at 858-59, had some bearing on the complexity of the exclusive
control issue.
40. Id. at 859.
41. Id. at 859.
42. Id Dr. C.F. Quest, a Minnegasco employee, was called by both parties and was
the only expert to testify regarding the cause of the explosion. Id.
43. The main was located at a depth of 42 inches. Id at 858. Federal code require-
ments state that gas lines must be located at a minimum depth of 24 inches. See Respon-
dent's Brief at 3, Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1984). At
such a depth, gas lines are better protected against the stress of weight from overland
vehicles and superficial digging such as gardening and tilling. 344 N.W.2d at 858. Min-
negasco periodically inspected the line for gas leaks, but found none prior to the explosion.
Id
44. 344 N.W.2d at 858. In late February the ground was frozen. This leached the gas
of its odor, making it undetectable except by mechanical testing. Id at 859.
45. Id
46. Id. Dr. Quest testified that the hit probably occurred at least several months
before the explosion. Id
47. Id. The court refused the plaintiff's request that the doctrine of strict liability be
applied. Id at 862. Failing this the plaintiffs had alternatively requested that the jury be
given a res ipsa loquitur instruction. Id. at 859, 862.
48. Id. at 859. The jury set damages at $110,850. Id
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Citing a long line of precedent, 49 the Minnesota Supreme Court con-
cluded that the trial court had properly refused to instruct the jury that
the gas distributor was strictly liable.50 The court held additionally that
the trial court should have instructed the jury as to res ipsa loquitur in
order for the jury to conclude whether the plaintiffs had met their bur-
den of proof.51 The court remanded the case for retrial based on the
49. Id at 861; see Brown v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 299 F. 463 (8th Cir. 1924) (negli-
gence standard applied to natural gas company which left open a row of light post holes
adjacent to gas main); King v. Public Serv. Co., 476 P.2d 52 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970) (recov-
ery for damages caused by escape of gas from mains on public way determined according
to negligence principles); Westfield Gas Corp. v. Hill, 131 Ind. App. 558, 169 N.E.2d 726
(1960) (explosion along leaking gas main is evidence of negligence); Blackman v. Iowa
Union Elec. Co., 234 Iowa 859, 14 N.W.2d 721 (1944) (gas company can only be liable for
its own negligence); Bayou Materials, Inc. v. City of Donaldsonville, 192 So. 2d 373 (La.
Ct. App. 1966) (plaintiff must prove negligence on part of city acting through its agents);
Musolino LoConte Co. v. Boston Consol. Gas Co., 330 Mass. 161, 112 N.E.2d 250 (1953)
(plaintiff must prove negligence of gas distributor who allowed gas fumes to enter plain-
tiff's warehouse, damaging food product); Bridges v. Moritz, 149 Mont. 273, 425 P.2d 721
(1967) (duty owed by defendant power company under a negligence standard is coexten-
sive with the risk in transmitting natural gas); Ward v. Iroquois Gas Corp., 233 A.D. 127,
251 N.Y.S. 300 (1931) (gas company is responsible only for its own negligence and is not
an insurer against accident); Bellevue Gas & Oil Co. v. Carr, 61 Okla. 290, 161 P. 203
(1916) (gas distributor liable only if negligent); Di Sandro v. Providence Gas Co., 40 R.I.
551, 102 A. 617 (1918) (explosion result of defendant's negligence); Nashville Gas & Heat-
ing Co. v. Phillips, 17 Tenn. App. 648, 69 S.W.2d 914 (1933) (floodwater caused break in
gas main, absolving defendant of negligence); Richey & Gilbert Co. v. Northwestern Nat-
ural Gas Corp., 16 Wash. 2d 631, 134 P.2d 444 (1943) (defendant's liability for damage to
building based on negligence); New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Water Power
Co., 34 Wash. App. 25, 659 P.2d 1113 (1983) (gas company not liable for third party
interference with gas main).
50. See 344 N.W.2d at 862.
51. See id at 864. "Res ipsa loquitur creates a permissive inference of negligence but
does not compel it. It does not shift the burden of proof. It simply gets the matter to the
jury under an appropriate instruction." Id (citing Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 290 Minn. 321, 333-34, 188 N.W.2d 426, 434-35 (1971) and Holkestad v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 288 Minn. 249, 255-56, 180 N.W.2d 860, 865-66 (1970)).
The court did not reach the issue of whether res ipsa can be applied against multiple
defendants in an escape of natural gas case in Minnesota. While appellants sought to use
res ipsa against both Minnegasco and Barbarossa, at trial they had requested a res ipsa
instruction against Minnegasco only. Id. at 862 n.4. Accordingly, the appellate court ad-
dressed only issues presented to the trial court. Id. (citing Bakke v. Rainbow Club, Inc.,
306 Minn. 99, 102-03, 235 N.W.2d 375, 378 (1975)).
It is not clear whether res ipsa can be used against multiple defendants in Minnesota.
In Spannaus v. Otolaryngology Clinic & Professional Assoc., 308 Minn. 334, 242 N.W.2d
594 (1976), the plaintiff received a neck injury during vocal cord surgery. The plaintiff
urged the court to adopt a rule allowing the use of res ipsa where multiple defendants
have acted collectively and all possible causes of the injury were under the exclusive con-
trol of the collective defendants. Id. at 337, 242 N.W.2d at 597; see also Ybarra v. Span-
gard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (where plaintiff receives unusual injuries while
unconscious during an appendectomy, all defendants who had control over plaintiff's
body or instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may be subject to a res
ipsa loquitur instruction). The Spannaus court, however, did not reach the issue of whether
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failure to provide a res ipsa loquitur instruction.52
The basis of the Mahowaldcourt's rejection of strict liability was three-
fold. First, the court relied on precedent. The rejection of strict liability
in Gould53 and the failure of other jurisdictions to impose strict liability
in gas transmission cases54 were influential. Second, the court declined
to apply sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.55 The
court noted its previous refusals to apply these sections, which impose
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities.56 Third, the court
distinguished Mahowald from previous Minnesota Supreme Court deci-
sions that imposed strict liability because in Mahowald exclusive control
was absent. 57 By emphasizing this factor, the Mahowaldcourt established
exclusive control as a new element of strict liability, an element unre-
lated to the theory itself.
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Todd, joined by Justices Scott
and Wahl, argued that the Gould negligence rule is an outdated standard
res ipsa loquitur should be allowed, since plaintiff failed to sue one member of the surgical
team. Spannaus, 308 Minn. at 337-38, 242 N.W.2d 597.
52. 344 N.W.2d at 864. The Mahowald court ruled that it was reversible error when
the trial court failed to give the res ipsa loquitur instruction. The court based this reason-
ing primarily on the fact that since the gas company had superior knowledge of the gas
distribution system, access, and the opportunity to identify possible causes of the accident,
it should have the burden of overcoming an inference of negligence. Id at 863-64.
53. Could, 100 Minn. at 261, 111 N.W. at 255.
54. 344 N.W.2d at 861; see supra note 49 (salient case law).
55. See supra note 12 (providing text of §§ 519 and 520 and tracing their
development).
56. The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously considered §§ 519 and 520, but the
court has never applied the abnormally dangerous activity test. See Cairl v. City of St.
Paul, 268 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Minn. 1978) (Restatement standard of ultrahazardous activities
not applicable to an action against a city to recover damages to an automobile arising out
of a high-speed police chase because it is the public duty of police to pursue traffic offend-
ers); Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 32, 239 N.W.2d 190, 193-94
(1976) (where youth was injured by falling branch caught on high-voltage line, the court
expressly avoided the issue due to potentially severe economic consequences to small utili-
ties, and called the issue to the attention of the state legislature); Quigley v. Village of
Hibbing, 268 Minn. 541, 543, 129 N.W.2d 765, 767 (1964) (refusing to extend the rule of
absolute liability as set forth in §§ 519 and 520 to the escape of water from a village
pipeline).
57. See 344 N.W.2d at 860. The Mahowaldcourt indicated, with regard to previous
cases concerning strict liability, that there was no dispute that the instrumentality causing
damage was in fact under the exclusive control of the person charged. Id With regard to
cases involving gas mains laid in public streets, however, the same inference is in doubt.
Concerning the facts in Mahowald, the court stated:
[T]he facts in this case clearly show, [that] the city, its contractors, land develop-
ers, and others had access to the subsurface of the street wherein the gas mains
were laid, and did, in fact, alter the surface level, install water and sewer pipes in
the vicinity of the gas lines, and strike the line with heavy construction equip-
ment on at least two occasions.
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of liability and should be overruled.58 The dissenters argued that plac-
ing the burden to prove negligence on innocent victims like the Kan-
negieters is too onerous and unjustified given Minnegasco's resources,
knowledge, and ability to ascertain fault and seek indemnification from
third parties for natural gas explosions.5 9 The dissent advocated applica-
tion of the Restatement standard for abnormally dangerous activities,60
noting that the time had come to impose strict liability upon gas
distributors.6 1
The majority countered the dissent's reasoning, noting that the plain-
58. Id at 864-67 (Todd, J., dissenting). Discussing the equitable advantage available
under the strict liability rule, Justice Todd wrote, "Considering the nature of the franchise
held by the gas company and its ability to distribute its losses, if any, among a broad
group of ratepayers, this result is not only equitable, but is demanded by modern concepts
of liability without fault." Id at 864 (Todd, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 868-69 (Todd, J., dissenting); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 519-520 (1977) (abnormally dangerous activities). The question is whether the
risk of explosion and fire from a gas leak can be eliminated by exercising reasonable care
or care commensurate with the risk. If the answer is no, then the Restatement standard
should apply to natural gas distributors. See 344 N.W.2d at 867-68 (Todd, J., dissenting);
see also New Meadows, 34 Wash. App. at 36-37, 659 P.2d at 1119-20 (Mclnturff, J., dissent-
ing) (failure to impose strict liability on the gas company is in essence strict liability on the
innocent victim); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 4, § 14.3, at 794-95 (when negli-
gence is the sole basis for recovery of damages, some innocent victims will go uncompen-
sated). For works on loss allocation and economically distributing losses, see generally G.
CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 301-03
(3d ed. 1983); Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Pscholog a/Common-Law Thought, 56 S.
CAL. L. REv. 711 (1983); Hatch, Is the Pocket Deep Enough.-, 16 FOR THE DEF. 117-18
(1975) (trend toward payment without fault must be reversed); Morris, Hazardous Enter-
prises and Risk Bearing Capaci'ty, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952); Reynolds, supra note 15.
60. See 344 N.W.2d at 867-69 (Todd,J., dissenting). Seegenerally RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1977). For the text of sections 519 and 520, see supra note 12.
61. See 344 N.W.2d at 867-69 (Todd, J., dissenting). To support its position, the dis-
sent used an analogy to loss suffered when a water main broke. See id at 866-67 (Todd, J.,
dissenting). Justice Todd cited Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 158 'Minn. 509,
197 N.W. 971 (1924), a case in which the court imposed liability without proof of negli-
gence by stating:
Congestion of population in large cities is on the increase. This calls for water
systems on a vast scale either by the cities themselves or by strong corporations.
Water in immense quantities must be accumulated and held where none of it
existed before. If a break occurs in the reservoir itself, or in the principal mains,
the flood may utterly ruin an individual financially. In such a case, even though
negligence be absent, natural justice would seem to demand that the enterprie, or what
really is the same thing, the whole community benefited by the enterprise, should stand the loss
rather than the individual It it too heavy a burden upon one.
158 Minn. at 511, 197 N.W. at 972 (emphasis added) quoted in 344 N.W.2d at 867 (Todd,
J., dissenting). In summary, Justice Todd stated that: "Natural gas, like water accumu-
lated in large quantities, has similar inherently destructive capabilities. In 1984, I fail to
perceive any logical reason for distinguishing between a ruptured water main and a sev-
ered gas line." 344 N.W.2d at 867 (Todd, J., dissenting).
Justice Todd cited extensively to the dissenting opinion in New Meadows, 34 Wash.
App. at 35-44, 659 P.2d at 1119-24, written by Justice McInturff. Justice McInturff
stated:
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tiffs' real estate and personal property losses were largely compensated by
homeowners insurance.62 The court speculated further that personal in-
jury losses were also covered by insurance. 63 The majority acknowl-
edged, however, that recovery based on insurance may be incomplete.64
The court concluded that it is not the innocent victim who ultimately
pays in the majority of cases, but rather subrogation insurers who have
collected premiums. 6 5 Under a strict liability rule, these insurance com-
panies would be allowed to shift the risk to the gas company and its rate
payers, "notwithstanding that the gas company may be free of
negligence."
66
In ordering a res ipsa instruction, the Mahowald court differentiated
the type of exclusive control required to impose strict liability from the
type of exclusive control required to apply res ipsa. Exclusive control
During periods of technological or industrial advance which promise great
societal benefits, theories of loss allocation which place the risk of serious loss
upon the members of society for technological or industrial accidents not attribu-
table to an identifiable person breaching an articulable standard, may be accept-
able for the well-being of society and consequently, just. To hold otherwise
places unreasonable restraints upon the development of society as a whole that
ultimately would be adverse to the well-being of its individual members. But
once the promised benefits, such as here-the widespread use of a relatively
clean and inexpensive energy source-have become a reality, the risk of serious
loss should be spread among the beneficiaries of the advance and not thrust
upon a faultless victim.
Just how prevalent are injuries and damage from natural gas explosions?
The majority correctly states there are fewer than 25 deaths each year in the
United States from this kind of malfunction. Six years ago 466 failures involving
transmission and gathering lines were reported to the Department of Transpor-
tation. 10 United States Dep't of Transp., Natural Gas Ppehne Safety Act Annual
Report (1977) at note 1, p. 3. So the possible liability of any natural gas transmis-
sion company is not at a level so high as to be economically prohibitive when
measured against the cost of insurance to compensate persons injured, or pay-
ment for property damaged by a gas explosion. The loss would be spread among
its customers.
When this country was being developed, when today was still in the future,
and when industry was in infancy struggling to acquire a foothold, it was under-
standable that the law would only grant judgment against those at fault-those
who were at least negligent. Today, however, the natural gas industry is not
struggling, it is thriving and expanding.
344 N.W.2d at 866 (Todd, J., dissenting) (citing New Meadows, 34 Wash. App. at 37-39,
659 P.2d at 1120-21 (Mclnturff, J., dissenting)).
62. 344 N.W.2d at 861; of Wilson, 267 Minn. at 165-66, 125 N.W.2d at 728 (plaintiff
claimed he had developed a traumatic depression because the property damage loss from
an explosion was uninsured; evidence showed that all but $255 of his $28,700 property
damage loss had been paid by insurance).
63. 344 N.W.2d at 861 n.3. Speculation that the plaintiffs personal injury losses were
covered by insurance was based on plaintiff's employment, education, and experience. Id
64. See id. The court recognized that general damages, such as pain and suffering and
loss of consortium, are not covered by insurance. Id
65. Id at 861-62. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 82 (discussion of
the effects of insurance on litigation).
66. 344 N.W.2d at 862.
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under strict liability was used to distinguish the gas distributor's trans-
mission lines from other abnormally dangerous activities in which strict
liability is applied. The court decided the exclusive control question on
the basis of the relationship between the element and its environment,
and concluded that the gas line was subject to control by numerous
sources.6 7 Under res ipsa, however, the court held that exclusive control
arises from the gas distributor's responsibility to reasonably inspect and
maintain its lines.68 Applying this definition, the court concluded that
the gas line might well be found to be under the distributor's exclusive
control, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
6 9
The majority's argument suggests that the "commonly understood
connotation" of exclusive control applies to the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity.
7
0 Res ipsa loquitur validity is to be determined, however, by a less
than undivided form of exclusivity.7 1 While this definitional variation
appears plausible on the surface, closer examination reveals inherent
contradictions.
The Mahowaldcourt cited the late Professor William Prosser as author-
ity for employing exclusive control as a flexible term. 72 Prosser suggested
that exclusive control should not be limited to rigid interpretation, but
should in some instances be equated with a non-delegable duty.73 Those
are instances in which the defendant has the right and opportunity of
control.74 The Mahowald court found that the defendant gas company's
status presented such an instance. 75 This finding, however, is inconsis-
67. See id. at 860. According to Prosser and Keeton, "There has been general recogni-
tion in these nuisance cases that the relation of the activity to its surroundings is the con-
trolling factor." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 78, at 552.
68, See 344 N.W.2d at 863; see also supra note 49 (cases discussing duty to inspect and
maintain pipelines).
69. 344 N.W.2d at 864.
70. See id at 860, 863 n.5 (distinguishing Mahowald based on lack of exclusive control
"as that term is normally used and understood"). "In ordinary parlance, 'exclusive con-
trol' connotes that no other person or entity had any control over the instrumentality
which caused the damage." 1d at 863.
71. Id (limiting exclusive control to responsibility for reasonable inspection and
maintenance).
72. Id. (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 39, at 218-21 (4th
ed. 1971)). See generally Jacks, supra note 7 (divergence in case law); Note, The Applicat'on of
Res Ipsa Loquitur in Suits Against Multiple Defendants, 34 ALB. L. REV. 106 (1969) (in Califor-
nia, res ipsa loquitur has been applied in some situations despite absence of exclusive
control); Note, Res Ipsa Loquitor: Relaxation of the Requirement of Exclusive Control, 12 Hous. L.
REV. 943, 945-46 (1975) (the term exclusive control is "ambiguous and subject to semantic
manipulation").
73. W. PROSSER, supra note 72, § 39, at 220 (corresponding statement in PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 4, § 39, at 250).
74. Id (offering as an example a situation where an owner is present when someone
else is driving his car).
75. See 344 N.W.2d at 863 (noting the defendant gas distributor's "non-delegable re-
sponsibility to maintain and inspect its mains in the public streets at all times"). The
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tent with the court's own analysis. The majority stated that events likely
to have resulted in the hit on the gas main were "[aictivities, of which the
gas company frequently has no notice, [and which] are normally taking
place on streets over which the company has no meaningful control."76
Therefore, the court failed to sustain its own argument when applying
the less rigid definition in that the gas company did not have the oppor-
tunity of control.
The majority's definition of exclusive control is both frustrating and
illogical. By attempting to utilize two uncoordinated definitions, the
court has created uncertainty as to the doctrines of both strict liability
and res ipsa loquitur.
Why the court, in refusing to apply strict liability, distinguished
Mahowald on the basis of exclusive control is unclear. Strict liability is
based not on exclusive control, but on the creation of an abnormal risk of
harm. 77 As Prosser stated, "The basis of the liability is the defendant's
intentional behavior in exposing those in his vicinity to such a risk." 78
Lack of exclusive control at the time of injury does not negate strict
liability. 79 The defendant's liability may be absolved only by a supersed-
court stated that Minnegasco had "superior knowledge of the gas distribution system,.
access and opportunity to identify persons acting in the vicinity of the gas mains, .
inspection and control over the mains, and . responsibility for the safety of the persons
and property in the community." Id.
76. Id. at 862.
The burden of proving that a natural gas company was negligent in the opera-
tion of its gas distribution system is indeed onerous. That is true, in part at least,
because the gas company does not have complete exclusive control over its distri-
bution lines located on public right-of-ways. Activities, of which the gas com-
pany frequently has no notice, are normally taking place on streets over which
the company has no meaningful control. Here, for example, the city laid water
and sewer lines in proximity to the gas lines; contractors tapped those mains to
make service connections; either the city or the developer reduced the street
grade after installation of the gas mains; and the city contracted for street serv-
icing. Perhaps in most instances a specific event can be isolated to establish the
nexus between the event and the damage so liability can be properly allocated.
When that cannot be done, as here, the injured party faces substantial obstacles
in attempting to establish that the gas distribution company was causally
negligent.
Id.
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 519 comment d (1977).
[Strict] liability arises out of the abnormal danger of the activity itself, and the
risk that it creates, of harm to those in the vicinity. It is founded upon a policy of
the law that imposes upon anyone who for his own purposes creates an abnormal
risk of harm to his neighbors, the responsibility of relieving against that harm
when it does in fact occur.
Id
78. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 75, at 537.
79. See, e.g., Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska
1978). In Yukon, a storage magazine under the control of defendant and containing 80,000
pounds of explosives exploded, damaging dwellings and buildings within a two mile ra-
dius. Id at 1207. The magazine was not under the exclusive control of the defendant, as
evidenced by the fact that thieves triggered the explosion. Id Despite the lack of exclusive
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ing cause.8 0 An intervening cause is not superseding unless the act was
not reasonably foreseeable to the original wrongdoer.8  Lack of exclusive
control may be readily foreseeable. In Mahowald, activity around the gas
main subsequent to placement was foreseeable, and it was also foresee-
able that digging and resurfacing could result in damage to the pipe.82
Thus, the gas distributor should have been held strictly liable. The court
erred in misinterpreting exclusive control and not analyzing control in
terms of foreseeability.
The Mahowald court's web becomes increasingly tangled when one
considers its definition of exclusive control under res ipsa loquitur. This
flexible definition equates exclusive control with non-delegable duty.
8 3
The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously determined that the exist-
ence of a continuing duty precludes an intervening cause from vitiating
liability.8 4 The Mahowald court, by ordering a res ipsa instruction, ne-
gated the distinction upon which it denied strict liability.
The Mahowald decision is a product of result-oriented reasoning. As
the majority stated, it did not seek to make the gas company an insurer
of the plaintiff.as To implement this objective, the court was forced to
distinguish the instant case from other strict liability cases. Exclusive
control was utilized as the distinguishing factor.86 The court's second
objective was to provide the innocent plaintiff with a strong opportunity
for recovery.8 7 The method selected was a res ipsa loquitur instruction.
But the court could not remand for this instruction unless exclusive con-
control, the court applied strict liability and noted that the presence of thieves was not so
uncommon an occurrence as to constitute a superseding cause. See id at 1211.
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) & comment c (1965). A super-
seding cause negates liability under strict liability and negligence. See Yukon, 585 P.2d at
1211; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 79, at 563-65.
81. See Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983).
An intervening act is not superseding unless (1) its harmful effects must have
occurred after the original negligence; (2) it has not been brought about by the
original negligence; (3) it actively worked to bring about a result which would
not otherwise have followed from the original negligence; and (4) it was not rea-
sonably foreseeable by the original wrongdoer.
Id at 915 (citing Kroeger v. Lee, 270 Minn. 75, 78, 132 N.W.2d 727, 729-30 (1967)).
82. See 344 N.W.2d at 860 ("the city, its contractors, land developers, and others had
access to the subsurface . . . and did, in fact, alter the subsurface level, install water and
sewer pipes in the vicinity of the gas lines, and strike the line with heavy construction
equipment on at least two occasions").
83. See id. at 863; see also supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
84. See Sandhofer v. Abbott-Northwestern Hosp., 283 N.W.2d 362, 368 n.2 (Minn.
1979) (citing Mikes v. Baumgartner, 277 Minn. 423, 430, 152 N.W.2d 732, 737 (1967)).
85. 344 N.W.2d at 859; see id at 863 n.5 ("it is one thing to make a gas distributor an
insurer but quite a different proposition to allocate to the gas company the duty of over-
coming an inference of negligence following an explosion").
86. See id at 860.
87. The court implied that the substantial obstacles the plaintiff faced in establishing
the gas company's negligence justified a res ipsa loquitur instruction. See id at 862.
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trol was present. The majority, finding itself reasoned into a corner, was
forced to develop its novel interpretation of exclusive control.
The legacy of such reasoning is unfortunate.88 The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur has been blurred in that exclusive control has been stripped of
its common sense meaning. Strict liability has been complicated in that
it is no longer clear which theory the court recognizes. The supreme
court rejected the traditional Rylands doctrine by introducing a require-
ment of exclusive control and refusing to apply the Restatement standard.
Further, the court denied validity to the insurance rationale supporting
strict liability. The uncertainty regarding strict liability and res ipsa
which emerges from Mahowald has breathed new life into the time-worn
adage that "hard facts make bad law."
Commercial Law-THE EFFECT OF A FILING OFFICER'S MISTAKE ON
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE PRIORITY DISPUTES-Borg Warner Accept-
ance Corp. v. ITT Diversified Credit Corp., 344 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. 1984).
The general Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)I priority rule provides
that the first security interest filed or perfected has priority over all subse-
quent security interests.2 An exception to this rule is made for purchase
money security interests in inventory if the purchase money secured
party notifies prior creditors of its interest in the inventory.3 The
purchase money secured party can obtain a list of prior creditors to no-
tify by requesting a UCC search from the Secretary of State's office.
4
According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, however, if a prior creditor
does not receive notice because the Secretary of State omits his name
from the list, that creditor's security interest will retain priority over the
88. Id at 869 (Todd, J., dissenting). In its limited rebuttal to the majority's definition
of exclusive control, the dissent stated that the "attempt to redefine res ipsa loquitur [is]
illogical and confusing." Id The dissent argued that if the court was creating a new form
of relief it should say so, rather than attempting to disguise the new remedy in the clothing
of res ipsa loquitur. Id
1. In Minnesota the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted, is codified in MINN.
STAT. ch. 336 (1982 & Supp. 1983). Minnesota adopted article nine of the Code in 1965.
See Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 811, 1965 Minn. Laws 1290, 1450-84.
2. This general first in time, first in right rule is contained in MINN. STAT. § 336.9-
312(5) (Supp. 1983). For a discussion of this rule and its justifications, see in/fa notes 23-31
and accompanying text.
3. MINN. STAT. § 336.9-312(3) (Supp. 1983). For a discussion of this exception and
its purposes, see inra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
4. MINN. STAT. § 336.9-407(2) (1982) provides that the Secretary of State shall,
upon request, search its files for financing statements naming a particular creditor and
report what he finds.
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